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 Abstract 
Since the legal form adopted by a firm determines the type of legal responsibility borne by its 
owners in case of bankruptcy, in this paper we argue that a firm under a limited liability status 
should be characterized by a higher than average risk exposure, defined in terms of a lower 
capital-labor ratio for a given capital structure, which ultimately determines the bankruptcy 
probability when output is affected by exogenous shocks. To test these predictions we extend 
Lee’s (1976) switching regressions model to a panel dataset of 1,313 Spanish firms from 
1990-1994, separating them into corporate and entrepreneurial forms (with/without limited 
liability, respectively). We consider both random effects and fixed effects panel data models, 
taking into account the endogeneity between risk exposure and the legal form choice. Our 
results confirm the hypothesis that firms under limited liability have significant higher risk 
exposure than firms under unlimited liability. 
Resumen 
Puesto que la forma legal de una empresa determina el tipo de responsabilidad legal de sus 
propietarios en caso de quiebra, en este trabajo argumentamos que las empresas con 
responsabilidad limitada deberían caracterizarse por una mayor exposición al riesgo de 
quiebra, en términos de menor ratio capital-trabajo para una estructura financiera dada cuando 
la producción está sometida a shocks aleatorios. Para verificar empíricamente esta relación 
usaremos el modelo de Lee (1976) con un panel de 1313 empresas españolas durante el 
período 1990-1994, separándolas de acuerdo con su tipo de responsabilidad (limitada o 
ilimitada). Estimamos modelos de efectos fijos y de efectos aleatorios para datos de panel, 
teniendo en cuenta la endogeneidad entre la exposición al riesgo y la forma legal adoptada por 
la empresa. Nuestras estimaciones confirman la hipótesis de que la forma jurídica tiene 
efectos sobre la exposición al riesgo de las empresas españolas. 
Keywords: limited liability, risk exposure, sample selection, switching regressions, panel 
data. 
JEL Classification: C20, G32, L21. 
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1 Introduction 
Standard economic analysis often presumes that, in absence of relevant ownership-control 
conflicts, the ultimate aim of any firm’s manager is to obtain the highest possible profit. 
This approach, which is usually simplified into a single maximization problem with one or 
more constraints, ignores the fact that a firm’s objective function is not entirely 
independent of its ownership structure. In this paper we intend to show that the firm’s legal 
form entails important implications with respect to the assignment of the residual rents it 
generates and, consequently, modifies the incentives of the individuals involved in this 
maximization problem, thus affecting their subsequent product or labor market decisions. 
Our basic argument relies on the well-known relationship between the legal form 
adopted by a firm and the type of legal responsibility faced by its owners in case of 
financial distress (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). When the owners are stockholders with 
limited liability over the residual rent, they are at risk for the firm’s obligations only up to 
the amount of their initial investments. If some of the firm’s financing is via debt (to be 
repaid before the owners get any return on their investments), they might prefer to make 
excessively risky decisions rather than maximize the value of the firm. If business does 
well, debtors are paid their contracted amounts and equity holders retain the remainder. 
When things go badly, debt is not repaid in full since creditors can only claim property 
owned by the company. Some of the losses are thus shifted onto the debtors; riskier 
decisions shift more of the downside onto the debtors and leave always the upside gain to 
the stockholders. 
There are different legal forms under which private business can be carried out. For 
example, as in most other countries, Spanish corporate law distinguishes between two main 
legal forms: one in which firms have no legal capacity separate from its owners (non-
corporate, individual firms or sole proprietorships), and other in which firms do have this 
capacity (corporate firms or societàrie forms). Characteristic examples of the former are 
the sole proprietorship (empresa individual) and the collective association (sociedad 
colectiva), whereas corporate forms are mostly limited liability ones (particularly, the 
sociedad anónima, SA, and the sociedad de responsabilidad limitada, SL). The 
distinguishing features of all these different legal forms according to Spanish corporate law 
have been summarized in Table 1. 
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[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Since the pioneering work by Berle and Means (1932), a whole strand of the 
literature has related a firm’s legal status with its observed real market performance. Most 
authors have extensively appealed to the agency theory to explain the relationship between 
the ownership structure of an organization and the way in which operating decisions are 
made inside.1 We coincide with recent papers on corporate governance in the analysis of 
how changes in the ownership structure affect the firm’s decisions (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1996), although they usually do not compare different legal forms, or relate the comparison 
to tax advantages (Mackie-Mason and Gordon, 1997). We prefer instead a different path. 
We build a simple model from the ‘limited liability effect’ described above and test 
whether a distinct legal status (firms with/ without limited liability) affects the level of risk 
exposure to bankruptcy, measured through the choice of a capital-labor ratio for a given 
amount of debt when the output is affected by exogenous shocks on productivity. 
This analysis contributes to the literature on the limited liability effect started with a 
seminal paper by Brander and Lewis (1986), and later extended by Glazer (1994), 
Showalter (1995), Maksimovic (1995) and, more recently, Faure-Grimaud (2000). They all 
show that the limited liability confers some strategic effects to debt and may ultimately 
affect competition in prices, quantities or other real variables. A number of empirical 
papers have attempted to prove these effects in different settings. Opler and Titman (1994) 
investigate whether high-leveraged firms are more likely to experience performance losses 
in industry downturns than others. Chevalier (1995a, b) uses supermarket firms’ data to 
study the effects of LBOs on real variables. Phillips (1995) and Kovenock and Philips 
(1995) relate capital structure to pricing decisions in concentrated industries, and more 
recently, Showalter (1999) finds evidence on the strategic use of debt in limited liability 
firms for manufacturing industries and Campos (2000) extends the analysis to Spanish 
                                                 
1
 See Demsetz (1983) for a summary of the debate. There is also an extensive empirical literature relating the 
firms’ real behavior with descriptive factors (such as size, R&D, productivity, foreign or public capital, etc.) 
including the legal form as one of the explanatory variables (see a recent survey in Demsetz and Villalonga, 
2001). Among the few ones with Spanish data that explicitly consider the type of ownership, it is worth 
mentioning Fariñas et al. (1992), Galvé and Salas (1993) and Merino and Salas (1995). 
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data. Despite all these studies, the empirical tests of the limited liability effect are not yet 
conclusive.2 
Our main contribution in this paper is to study the effect of a firm’s chosen legal 
form on its choice of risk exposure, taking into account that both variables can be 
endogenously determined.3 This is the so-called ‘self-selection’ problem, in the sense that a 
firm might decide its legal status on the basis of unobserved factors that affect its risk 
exposure choice, but are not due to their chosen legal form. To address this issue, 
following Lee (1976), we estimate a switching regression model with endogenous 
switching. We extend Lee’s model in two ways. First, we use panel data, which allows for 
time invariant unobserved firm-specific effects that can be correlated with the regressors. 
In other words, we will allow for fixed effects, which would be impossible in the cross-
section context. The usual cross-section model imposes independence between individual 
effects and regressors, which, in a panel data context, leads to the more restrictive random 
effects model. In addition, there are two types of fixed effects models that we particularly 
consider here: a model in which selectivity only enters through the fixed effects and a 
model which incorporates more general selectivity effects. We compare results for these 
two fixed effects models with those of a random effects model. Moreover, since 
performance and results are also conditioned by the overall firm’s characteristics (activity 
sector, size, age, location), the comparison between these two types of legal forms will also 
take into account these elements. Our empirical results show that, for a given capital 
structure, there is a significant differentiated behavior between both types of legal forms. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a model that 
shows why real behavior across firms differs according to their owners’ liability status. To 
illustrate this idea we translate it into a standard partial equilibrium framework in the labor 
market, where, for a given capital structure, limited liability firms tend to assume more risk 
than their unlimited liability counterparts. More risk is defined in terms of choosing a 
lower capital-labor ratio and a lower expected labor productivity, since it will be proved 
that this implies higher output variance. Section 3 carries out an empirical analysis of this 
                                                 
2
 For example, Oechssler and Schhmacher (2001) propose an experimental model to test Brander and Lewis 
(1986) results in Bertrand and Cournot duopolies, finding weaker results than initially predicted. 
3
 Our dataset does not allow us to explicitly model the factors underlying the firm’s choice of it initial legal 
form. Turnover, tax advantages and administrative requirements are usually called for as explanatory 
variables. 
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model to test our hypothesis about the different behavior of firms according to their 
liability status. Section 4 summarizes the main results. 
2 A model of limited liability and risk in real decisions 
In this section we introduce a simple theoretical framework that relates a firm’s liability 
status (defined by its legal form, according to each country’s corporate laws) with real 
decisions in the labor market made to maximize expected operating profits in a static 
setting. The model will be developed in two steps. We will first outline the general 
relationship between the limited or unlimited liability statuses with the risk attitude of the 
firm’s owners. Then, as a particular example of this relationship, we will relate the firm’s 
risk attitude with its hiring decisions in a neoclassical, partial equilibrium, labor market. 
2.1 Limited liability and risk attitudes 
When a firm is under unlimited personal liability (usually a single-owner firm) there is no 
difference between the proprietor’s earnings and the market profits generated by her firm. 
By definition, the firm is part of the entrepreneur’s personal estate and she cannot make 
distinctions among its elements. The owner, by itself or via debt, provides the funds 
needed to keep the firm in operation, then real decisions are taken in order to maximize 
(expected) profits and, finally, at the end of any period, positive net earnings automatically 
increase her personal wealth, whereas negative earnings automatically decrease it. 
This rent allocation completely differs when the firm is a corporation with limited 
liability. In this case the owners (namely, shareholders) are only entitled to a share of 
profits and to certain control rights to appoint a manager or a board of directors, who 
intends to maximize (expected) profits on their appointers’ behalf.4 Positive net earnings 
imply a payoff to the owners (dividends), but negative ones are not translated in the same 
way into their wealth. By law, losses are limited to the shareholders’ initial contribution so 
that their personal estate is no longer open to unsatisfied creditors. 
This asymmetry is hampered by corporate law in most countries, introducing 
different incentives for real decision-making depending on the firm legal status and 
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 Note that, since we intend to focus on the limited liability effect, in this simple formulation we will ignore 
conflicts between managers and owners. Similarly, it is assumed for simplicity that no dividends are retained 
in this single-period world. 
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liability. To see this, let ( )E u W  %  be the firm’s owners’ expected utility, where, as usual, 
u(·) functional form defines their risk attitude with respect to final net wealth. Let us 
assume the owners are initially risk neutral, so that u(·) is linear, and therefore by 
construction: 
 ( ) ( )E u W u E W   =   % % . [1] 
Variable W% represents any period stochastic net wealth earned by the firm, given 
by the difference between operating profit ( pi~ ), which depends on the firms’ operating 
decisions, and payments owed to external creditors (D). Then, the owners’ net wealth at 
the end of any period will be a transformation ofW%, that is, UW D= pi −% %  for unlimited 
liability firms, or { }max ,0LW D= pi −% %  for limited liability ones. 
In general, we can write ( )j jW g D= pi −% % , with j=U, L; where gj (·) functional form 
now defines the owners’ risk attitude with respect to net operating profits. Note that gU (·) 
is linear, so that initial risk neutrality does not change for unlimited liability firms, whereas 
gL (·) is convex, so that limited liability firms become risk-lovers with respect to profits. 
This result confirms the hypothesis advanced by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) that limited 
liability protection is associated with riskier entrepreneurial activity. In a more recent 
paper, Asplund (2002) generalizes this idea to the study of risk-aversion in any oligopoly 
models. 
The change in the owners’ risk attitude with respect to the operating profits 
modifies the firm’s real decision when intending to maximize them. This result can be 
formally proved by noting that [1] is equivalent to: 
( )( ) ( )( )j jE u g D u E g D   pi − = pi −   % % , 
which becomes ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )U U UE u g D u E g D u g E D     pi − = pi − = pi −     % % %  for unlimited 
liability firms because gU(·) is linear. Thus, by defining the composite function fU=u o gU, it 
results that in this case 
( ) ( )U UE f D f E Dpi − = pi −      % % , 
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and the firm’s owners are also risk neutral with respect to operating profits. Similarly, for 
limited liability firms, expression [1] is equivalent to  
( )( ) ( )( )L LE u g D u E g D   pi − = pi −   % % , 
with ( )( ) ( )( )L Lu E g D u g E D   pi − > pi −   % %  after using Jensen’s inequality and the fact 
that u’(·)>0. Hence, 
( ) ( )L LE f D f E Dpi − > pi −      % %  
where fL=u o gL, and the firm owners become risk lover in profits. 
Note that capital structure plays a crucial role in these relationships, since the 
amount of debt implicitly defines the bankruptcy probability faced by a firm and, 
consequently, the extent to which owners under limited liability are protected. Under 
limited liability, more debt financing involves by definition a higher risk of failure, the cost 
of which is not borne by the firm’s owners. Thus, the larger the debt level, the higher the 
change in risk attitude in favor of riskier decisions affecting operating profits.5 
To include capital structure decisions in the above results it is required to extend the 
model to a previous stage in which firms first make financial decisions and then decide on 
the operating variables that ultimately determine the value of pi~ . The model can be 
formulated as a two-stage game, where sub-game perfect equilibrium is achieved by 
backwards induction. Each firm first decide on its real variables for a given capital 
structure, and then select in the first stage the amount of debt that maximizes 
[ ]( ) ( ( ) )E u W E u D D  = pi − % % . 
The resulting payoffs are obtained by replacing this optimal debt level (say, D*) into the 
second-stage net profit function. The exact value of D* will depend on the type of strategic 
interaction among firms, as showed both by Brander and Lewis (1986) and Faure-Grimaud 
(2001). 
                                                 
5
 This relationship assumes that any other risk sources affecting the bankruptcy probability (for example, 
aggregate risk at the economy-wide level) does not depend on the firm’s capital structure. 
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2.2 Risk attitude and real behavior in the labor market 
This subsection presents a simple labor market model that, within a standard partial 
equilibrium framework, serves to illustrate the idea that different liability regimes imply 
different real behavior among firms. The model, based on a representative firm with risk 
neutral owners, builds on Padilla and Requejo (2000). After choosing its legal form 
between a limited or unlimited liability status, our analysis starts by considering that the 
firm has access to a production technology which requires an investment of I > 0 to buy a 
certain level of capital stock for the period. The production function yields X(N) units of 
output if N workers are hired in a competitive labor market at an exogenous known wage, 
w, the same for all firms.6 
In order to finance the investment, which is larger than the owners’ initial wealth, 
the firm issues debt with face value D>0. Then, the product is sold in a competitive product 
market, at an ex-ante uncertain market price, θ~ , which is assumed to be independently and 
identically distributed among firms according to a (twice-continuously differentiable) 
cumulative distribution function F(·). The proceeds of the sale minus the wage bill 
constitute the firm’s operating profits, ( )X N wNpi = θ −%% , which are used for debt repayment 
and shareholders’ rewarding.7 
In this short-run setup, the firm’s problem is just to choose the number of workers 
to hire in order to maximize the owners’ expected net wealth. We will show that the results 
of this decision depend on the legal status of the firm. Thus, for an unlimited liability firm, 
the objective function it intends to maximize is 
 [ ] ( )UW E D E X N wN D = pi − = θ − − %%  [2] 
whose first order condition, given by ( )w E X N ′= θ % , implies, as usual, that the firm hires 
workers until their expected marginal productivity equals the market wage. 
                                                 
6
 The production function also satisfies the standard technical conditions: X(0)=0, X’(0)>0, X”(0)<0 , 
limN→0X’(·)=∞, and limN→∞X’(·)=0. 
7
 As pointed out by a referee, the amount of initial debt could be different for limited/unlimited firms since in 
a perfect credit market the lenders would anticipate each firm’s behavior. A different debt level, however, 
does not change the predictions of the model. 
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Alternatively, limited liability firms face a different problem. Since their owners are 
protected by law in case of financial distress, their expected net wealth is given 
by { }max ,0LW E D= pi −  % , that is 
 ( )  ·Pr( ) ( )L
wN D wN DW E X N wN D
X N X N
   + +
= θ − − θ > θ >  
   
% % %
, [3] 
where the last part denotes the non-default probability. Therefore, employment is chosen 
so that the market wage equals the expected value of the marginal productivity of labor 
conditional on the ex-post value of their claims to the firm’s net wealth being positive. 
Hence, the first order condition is now 
 ( )  ( )
wN D
w E X N
X N
 +
′= θ θ > 
 
% %
, [4] 
stating that the employment level is now chosen by setting the market wage equal to a 
higher expected marginal productivity. For a given employment level, N, the set of states 
of nature (price realizations) considered by limited liability owners is a strict subset of the 
set of states considered by unlimited liability ones. Hence, by concavity of X(·), limited 
liability results in over-employment and inefficiency with respect to the unlimited liability 
case, where the firm simply maximizes its expected (unconditional) value. 
The intuition behind these results, described at section 2.1 above, is the same as in 
the well-known ‘over-investment’ problem of Jensen and Meckling (1976), which Brander 
and Lewis (1986) translated into the ‘excessive risk shifting’ of the limited liability effect. 
Because of this limited liability, the owners’ ex-post valuations of the firm’s results are 
convex so that they behave as risk lovers: among those projects with the same ex-ante 
value, they would prefer the project with more variability in its ex-post returns, thus 
assuming excessive risks. In our model, an increase in N constitutes a mean preserving 
spread in the distribution of the firm’s ex-post returns, since it is immediate to see that 
( )
( ) 0
E X N wN
E X N w
N
 ∂ θ −   ′= θ − = ∂
%
%
, and
Var ( )
2Var( ) ( ) 0
X N wN
X N
N
 ∂ θ − 
′= θ >
∂
%
%
. 
Hence, a higher employment level (or, conversely, a lower capital-labor ratio) for a given 
capital structure always implies a higher risk exposure. 
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Finally, the model can be also completed introducing capital structure decisions. 
The procedure would be similar to that described above, using the value of the firm as a 
whole (V) to determine the optimal debt level issued by each type of firm in a previous first 
stage. Thus, by noting that the equilibrium levels of employment resulting from [2] and [4] 
are themselves functions of the debt level, N*U[D] and N*L[D], the debt-choice problem 
becomes the maximization of * *[ ( )] ( )j j jV E X N D wN D = θ − % , with j=U, L. The resulting 
first order condition, 
* *
'( ) 0j j jdV dN dNE X N w
dD dD dD
 
= θ − = 
  
%
, 
confirms that debt plays a role only in limited liability firms since, according to [2], 
( )w E X N ′= θ %  in unlimited liability ones.
8
 Note however that these additional 
calculations do not change the main relationship obtained in [4] and, therefore, we can 
directly proceed to test it. 
3 Empirical analysis 
In this section, we empirically analyze the relationship between a firm’s legal status and its 
risk exposure, according to the predictions of the theoretical framework in section 2. In 
particular, we estimate how the choice of labor productivity and the capital-labor ratio 
differs among Spanish firms, depending on their legal form, accounting for the fact that 
both variables could be jointly determined. To address this particular problem we make use 
of panel data techniques, which allow for time invariant unobserved firm-specific effects. 
3.1 Data source and sample selection 
We use data from the waves 1990-1994 of the Encuesta Sobre Estrategias Empresariales 
(ESEE, Spanish Firms’ Strategies Survey),9 which contains complete balance sheets data, 
employment and product market information for 2,595 Spanish manufacturing firms. Our 
sample is restricted to private firms with one of the following different legal forms: sole 
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 This result does not imply that unlimited liability firms have no debts, but that they do not face the ‘limited 
liability effect’ mentioned above. 
9
 For further details on the ESEE, see Fariñas and Jaumeandreu (1995). 
 10 
proprietorship (empresa individual) and firms with limited liability (sociedad anónima, 
SA, and sociedad de responsabilidad limitada, SL). These three legal forms represent 
more than 85% of all private firms in the Spanish economy. Public sector and government-
controlled firms are not included in our sample, owing to their special characteristics.10 For 
the same reason, our final sample also excludes those firms that were taken over or 
experienced significant changes in their governance structures and firms that divested part 
of their business units during the sample period. Furthermore, in order to minimize the 
incidence of extreme observations, those firms that modified their legal status more than 
once in the five-year period considered have been dropped from the sample. 
After filtering the sample we end up with 1,313 firms that at least remained for two 
consecutive years in the ESEE. Table 2 shows that most firms in our sample (88.65%) 
stayed in it for the whole five-year period considered.11 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
In order to test the theoretical predictions about the different behavior of firms 
according to their liability status, we estimated the effect of having or not limited liability 
on two different dependent variables reflecting firm’s risk exposure: labor productivity and 
capital-labor ratio. Labor productivity has been defined as the proportion of earnings 
before interest, taxes, amortization and the wage bill over total employment, whereas the 
capital-labor ratio is defined as the proportion of fixed assets over total employment. 
Limited liability has been defined as a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the firm is SA 
or SL, and 0 otherwise. 
The explanatory variables used in the estimation can be classified into two groups: 
variables relating the capital structure ratio, and variables representing several descriptive 
characteristics of the firm. In the first group we include the ratio of total debt to total 
assets. The potential endogeneity of this variable will be properly taken into account 
below. In the second group we included a set of dummy variables reflecting the size and 
age of the firm, if there is coincidence between managers and owners, if the firm is capital 
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 We also excluded other existing legal forms (labor-managed firms and partnerships) of minor importance 
in the Spanish economy. Possibly their different governance rules could distort our results. 
11
 In order to retain as many observations as possible, the unbalanced sample design has been 
preferred to a balance design. Furthermore, deleting those observations which are not represented in 
all five years would introduce a sample selection bias (see Pedersen et al., 1990). 
 11 
intensive, if it is quoted in the stock exchange and if the firm exports or imports. To 
complete the model specification, we have included time dummies to control for business 
cycle effects, sector dummies to control for industry-wide effects and localization 
dummies. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Variable definitions and summary statistics for the main variables are presented in 
Table 3. It can be observed that firms with limited liability hire a larger number of workers 
than firms with full liability. This result is not surprising since, by law, there is a 
requirement regarding the number of employees (or indirectly, the turnover size – see 
Table 1), to create a firm with limited liability. Moreover, these firms also have higher 
labor productivity and capital-labor ratio than the rest of the firms. 
3.2 Econometric model 
The panel data models we consider allow for firms’ specific effects, which are either 
assumed to be independent of the explanatory variables (random effects), or allowed to be 
correlated with the explanatory variables (fixed effects). Our starting point is the following 
system of equations: 
 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1
( 0)
´ 0
´ , 1
it it it
i t it i i t it
i t it i i t it
d x u
y x if d
y x if d
′= δ + ≥
= µ + β + η + ε =
= µ + β + η + ε =
1
  [5] 
where the indices i and t refer to firm i in period t (t=1,…,T); dit is a selection dummy 
variable, representing the firm’s legal form choice, which is 1 for limited and 0 for 
unlimited firms; xit is a vector of explanatory variables; yi0t and yi1t are continuous variables 
measuring risk exposure for limited and unlimited liability firms, respectively. Of the two 
variables, yi0t and yi1t, one is realized and the other is latent. Finally, ηi is an unobserved 
firm-specific time-invariant effect and (uit, εi0t, εi1t) are the error terms. β1, β0 and δ  are 
vectors of unknown parameters and 1(.) stands for the usual indicator function. 
Random effects 
In a random effects model we assume that uit, εi0t, εi1t and ηi are normally distributed and 
that ηi is independent of the vector xit. Therefore, consistent estimates of the parameters 
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can be obtained by pooling each wave of data (i.e., each cross-section). Therefore, we can 
drop the t-subscript and include the random effects into the error terms, which then become 
(ui, εi0+ηi, εi1+ηi). Subsequently, previous relationship could be estimated by ordinary 
least squares (OLS) techniques on the pooled data if the error terms ui, εi0+ηi and εi1+ηi 
are assumed to be independent of the variables in xit, or by instrumental variables (IV) if 
one of the x (in our case, debt) is allowed to be endogenous. Nevertheless, if di and yi are 
jointly determined, previous methods give inconsistent estimates of the parameters. 
Therefore, in order to account for the simultaneity between risk exposure and liability 
choice, we can use standard estimation techniques for a cross-section endogenous 
switching regression model.  
A detailed analysis of this type of models is given in Lee (1976). Lee’s approach 
consists of two steps. The first step is to estimate the pooled binary choice selection 
equation by maximum likelihood (a probit model). The second step requires estimating the 
risk exposure equations, taking into account the selectivity bias and the potential 
endogeneity of debt variables. Selection is accounted for by adding extra regressors, which 
can be seen as correction terms. These correction terms are functions of the index δ’xit. The 
parameters δ are replaced by their first round estimates. For the case of exogenous 
regressors, OLS estimates with the terms of correction added as additional regressors, lead 
to consistent estimates of the parameters. Potential endogeneity of debt can be accounted 
for by using IV (with lagged values as instruments) instead of OLS in the second step. 
Moreover, since normality of the errors is assumed, exclusion restrictions are not required. 
Details of this estimator have been included in the Appendix. 
Fixed effects 
The panel structure of our data allows us to relax and test some implicit assumptions in the 
cross-section or pooled data analysis. Specifically, the firm specific effects can be treated 
as time-invariant nuisance parameters, which, therefore, allows for correlation between 
fixed effects and regressors and errors. In this case, we explicitly include the time period in 
the notation. Estimation can be based on taking differences between periods t and t–1 in 
equation [5]. The assumptions with respect to the error terms of the differenced model 
determine the way to estimate the parameters. 
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If we assume that no selection bias is present after differencing, standard panel data 
estimation procedures can be used. Under the assumption of strict exogeneity of the 
explanatory variables, consistent estimates of the parameters can be obtained by OLS 
regression of the first differenced model, whereas IV on the differenced model should be 
applied in order to account for the potential endogeneity of debt. In these cases, there is no 
reason to estimate the auxiliary selection equation and only the risk exposure equation 
needs to be estimated. This corresponds to the assumption that possible selection effects on 
the risk equation only enter through correlation between ηi and (ui1,…, uiT).12 
A more general model is one in which selection not only enters through the fixed 
effect, but selectivity effects remain even after first differencing. In that case, we estimate a 
switching regression model for N firms observed T consecutive time periods. Therefore, 
this model accounts for the self-selectivity problem, as well as other forms of time-
invariant unobserved heterogeneity. A two-stage estimation procedure adding a selectivity 
correction in the differenced equation yields consistent estimates of the parameters. In this 
case, the selectivity terms are calculated in a first step estimating the selection equation for 
each year separately. As in the previous case, we can use OLS or IV in the second step 
depending on the assumption about the exogeneity of debt (see Appendix for details). 
3.3 Results 
In this section we report the estimates from the different models described above. Our 
basic motivation is to examine two considerations: endogeneity of the legal form choice 
and the impact of controlling for correlated time invariant unobserved heterogeneity.  
Results on the selection equation are presented in Table 4. In the first column we 
present the probit estimates based on the pooled data for the five waves, which are used to 
calculate the selection correction for the random effects model. In the rest of columns we 
include the estimates of the selection equation for each of the waves separately used to 
calculate the selection correction for the fixed effect model. The results for the five waves 
are quite similar to each other and the estimates based on the pooled data are always in 
range of the estimates based on the separate waves. Standard errors are lower that those for 
the five waves separately and all pooled estimates are significant at the 5% level. The 
                                                 
12
 This assumption has been previously used in the study of Pedersen et al. (1990) of wage differentials 
between public and private sector. 
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conclusions do not change. We find that the probability of choosing limited liability 
increases with size. The export/import effect is also positive, while the age of the firm has 
a negative effect. As expected, being the owner and the manager of the firm decreases the 
probability of limited liability. The regional dummies imply that limited liability is higher 
in other regions that in the poorest ones, where individual firms are more likely. Estimates 
based on the pooled data include time dummies for each wave. The estimates for the time 
dummies show that the probability of choosing limited liability increases over the sample 
period considered, ceteris paribus. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Results on the risk exposure equations are presented in Tables 5 and 6, which 
contain the results for the random effects and fixed effects models without and with 
correction for selection. The estimated standard errors take into account 
heteroskedasticity.13 In all cases, possible endogeneity of debt has been considered, being 
instrumented with its lagged values. The models are estimated on the unbalanced sample of 
1,239 firms that are observed over three or more periods. The reason is that in order to 
account for the possible endogeneity of debt we use, for the random effects models, lagged 
values of debt as instruments (lagged one and two periods ), which demands three 
successive observations of each firm.14 In the fixed effects models, the inclusion of first 
differenced explanatory variables makes debt dated t-1 a not valid instrument. Therefore, 
in this case, debt dated t-2 is used as instrument in order to obtain consistent estimates of 
the parameters under the assumption of endogeneity of debt.15 
Random effects estimates 
Table 5 reports the results based on the pooled data with no selection correction and with 
selection correction. The first two columns correspond to the labor productivity dependent 
variable and the last two columns correspond to the capital-labor ratio dependent variable. 
We considered the case in which debt is assumed to be exogenous, and the case where it is 
                                                 
13
 We considered the cases without and with time and sector dummies included. Since the dummies turned 
out to be insignificant, we only report the estimation results without them. 
14
 Since debt does not play a role in the selection equation, observations with missing information of debt 
lagged two periods are also used in the selection equation. 
15
 The use of additional lags of debt does not change the results and reduces the number of observations. 
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allowed to be endogenous. We tested exogeneity of debt by means of Hausman-type tests, 
based on the difference between pooled OLS and IV estimates for the model which 
considers limited liability as an exogenous variable, and on the difference between the 
switching estimators using OLS and IV in the second step for the model which accounts 
for selectivity. The realization of the test statistics ranges from 20.24 to 43.73, which is 
always higher than the critical value of a chi-square distribution with twelve and thirteen 
degrees of freedom respectively at 5%. We thus only report the estimation results 
accounting for the endogeneity of debt. Standard error of debt is higher when it is 
instrumented and the coefficient is lower in absolute value, although always negative. 
Regarding the rest of variables, our conclusions do not change with respect to the models 
that consider debt as an exogenous variable. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
Pooled IV (2SLS) estimates show that firms with limited liability have higher labor 
productivity and capital-labor ratio than the rest of firms, although the latter is not 
statistically significant. This result seems to contradict our theoretical predictions. 
However, once the endogeneity of the legal form choice is accounted form, we find that 
the risk exposure is significantly lower for firms that enjoy limited liability. This result is 
consistent with our theoretical prediction about the over-investment problem associated 
with limited liability. The gap between the two types of estimates shows the importance of 
accounting for unobserved characteristics that might affect the risk exposure choice but are 
not due to the legal form adopted.  
To test the hypothesis that simultaneity does exist, we test for σ1u - σ0u = 0. We find 
that this coefficient is significant, which implies that simultaneity does occur. Moreover, a 
very important issue concerns the sign of these covariances. As pointed out by Trost 
(1981), if self-selection is based on comparative advantage, that is, if all firms who are 
faced with the choice between two regimes choose the regime which yields a maximum 
value, then the expected relationship between the covariances is σ0u < σ1u and σ0u and σ1u 
can have any signs. In terms of expectations, if σ0u < σ1u it means that the expected 
unlimited result (in terms of risk exposure) of the unlimited firms will be greater than the 
expected limited result of the unlimited firms. Furthermore, it will also be true that the 
expected limited result of the limited firms will be grater than the expected unlimited result 
of the limited firms (see Appendix for a detailed discussion of this point). In our case, these 
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expected relationship holds both for the productivity and capital-labor ratio equations. So 
the estimates are consistent with the comparative advantage hypothesis. 
Fixed effects estimates 
Estimation results for the fixed effects models are included in Table 6, both under the 
assumption that legal form is exogenous (first differencing estimates), and allowing for its 
endogeneity (switching regression of the first differenced model). Estimation both under 
the assumption that debt is exogenous (OLS in the differenced model) and allowing for its 
endogeneity (IV in the differenced model) has been performed. Again, Hausman-type test 
comparing these two leads to rejecting exogeneity in all cases except in the models for the 
capital-labor ratio equation.16 Therefore, in these cases debt has not been instrumented. In 
general, as in Table 5, the effect of accounting for the endogeneity of debt is that estimated 
parameters are somewhat smaller in absolute value and the standard errors are higher.17  
We can observe that, in all cases and according to our theoretical predictions, there 
is a negative effect of limited liability on the risk adoption by the firm, although no 
significant effect is found with regards to the capital-labor ratio dependent variable. 
Moreover, relative to the rest of estimates, the within-groups estimates show a downward 
bias (in absolute value) in the coefficient of limited liability. This result is unsurprising, 
since the first differencing estimator controls for correlated unobserved heterogeneity, but 
in doing so we would expect it to introduce biases due to lack of strict exogeneity of the 
legal form explanatory variable. Again, the null hypothesis that there is no correlation 
between the disturbances in the risk exposure equations and the selection equation (that is, 
σ1u - σ0u = 0) is rejected, and the models are consistent with the comparative advantage 
hypothesis, albeit the evidence for the capital-labor ratio model is weak. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
To test the assumption of no correlation between the firm specific effects and the 
explanatory variables, we perform a Hausman test based on the difference between the 
random effects and the fixed effects estimates in Tables 5 and 6. The resulting values for 
                                                 
16
 In this case, the value of the chi-square with twelve degrees of freedom is 13.15, which has a p-value of 
35.81%. 
17
 When debt is instrumented we obtain a negative effect of this variable on the capital-labor ratio equation, 
although this effect is non significant. 
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the test statistics is at least 238.89. This exceed the critical χ211 and χ212 values at 
conventional significance levels, indicating that the random effects panel data model that 
does not allow for correlation between firm specific effects and the explanatory variables is 
misspecified. 
Regarding the comparison between fixed and random effects estimates that account 
for self-selection, it turns out that the estimates of the coefficients are upward biased in 
absolute value when correlated fixed effects are not considered. Comparing the results 
from the last columns in Tables 5 and 6, we can see that the failure in controlling for fixed 
effects overestimates the negative effect of limited liability in the risk exposure of the 
firms. 
4 Conclusions 
The main contribution of this paper has been to illustrate an empirical relationship between 
firms’ legal status and their real behavior by extending the usual link derived from the 
standard theory of risk exposure borne by the firms’ owners to a simple empirical study 
that highlights several stylized facts about Spanish firms’ legal form and its connection 
with their real activity. 
Consistent with the hypothesis we derived from a standard theoretical model, we 
have empirically showed that firms under limited liability have significant lower labor 
productivity and lower capital-labor ratio than firms under unlimited liability. That is, 
empirically, we observe the standard over-investment problem associated to the limited 
liability feature. Moreover, we only observe this empirical result when we allow in our 
regressions for the endogeneity between legal form and risk exposure and/or for existence 
of unobserved heterogeneity. 
We have estimated a switching regression model for panel data, which enables us to 
take into account the self-selection bias as well as other forms of time invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity. Our results indicate that the legal form choice is endogenous to the risk 
exposure adopted by the firm. Our analysis, using panel data information, also reveals the 
importance of accounting for unobserved time invariant specific effects correlated with the 
explanatory variables: the results indicate that both the random effects and the fixed effects 
without selectivity correction are too restrictive. Finally, we have identified two types of 
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bias not previously addressed by the literature: (i) a downwards bias induced by the 
exogeneity assumptions of the legal form choice; and (ii) an upwards bias due to ignoring 
time invariant firm effects which are correlated with the explanatory variables. Our results 
explicitly take into consideration these problems. 
Appendix 
Here we discuss some details of implementing the estimators which take selection into 
account, discussed in Section 3.  
Random effects 
The random effects model for one cross-section can be written as 
 
0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1
´ , 0
´ , 1
ii i i
ii i i
y x if d
y x if d
= µ + β + ν =
= µ + β + ν =  [A.1] 
where vi0 = εi0 +ηi , vi1 = εi1 +ηi and E(vi0) = E(vi1) = 0. Compared to the notation in 
Section 3, the time index t is omitted and the random effects are incorporated into the error 
terms, which are independent of xi. Variables yi0 and yi1 indicate the risk exposure outcome 
if di equals 0 or 1, respectively. Hence the effect of having limited liability for firm i will 
be given by the difference yi1-yi0. It measures how the risk exposure would vary with the 
legal form if legal form were not self-selected, but exogenously assigned. It is now useful 
to rewrite previous equation as follows 
 ( )0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0( ) ´ ( )´ ( )i i i i i i i i iy d x x d v v v d= µ + µ − µ + β + β − β + + −  [A.2] 
Taking conditional expectations, and since E(vi0)= 0, we have: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0 1 0 0 1 0| | ´ ´ | ( ) |i i i i i i i i i i iE y x E d x x x E d x g x E d x= µ + µ − µ + β + β − β + ,[A.3] 
where ( ) ( )1 0( ) | , 1 | , 1i i i i i i ig x E v x d E v x d= = − = . 
From [A.3] it is clear that the problem with OLS estimation is that E(vi0| xi,di=1)≠ 0 
and E(vi1| xi,di=1)≠ 0 because of the self-selection. Therefore, the OLS regression of y on d 
gives inconsistent estimates of the parameters. In order to obtain the true causal effect of d 
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on y we specify a reduced form probit for d, that is, ( )0i i id x u′= δ + ≥1 , where vi0, vi1 and 
ui are assumed to have a tri-variate normal distribution with mean zero and covariance 
matrix  
The estimation by maximum likelihood methods of the previous model could be 
very cumbersome, since it involves the evaluation of multiple integrals. For that reason, 
following Lee (1976), we use a simple two-stage estimation method, which gives estimates 
that are consistent. Since g(xi) is unobservable, what we have to do is to obtain the 
expected values of the residuals vi1 and vi0. The assumption of joint normality allows us to 
write18 
( ) ( )( )1 1
'| , 1
'
i
i i i u
i
x
E v x d
x
φ δ
= = σ
Φ δ
, 
and similarly for vi0, 
( ) ( )( )0 0
'| , 1
'
i
i i i u
i
x
E v x d
x
φ δ
= = σ
Φ δ
, 
where φ and Φ are the density function and the distribution function of the standard normal 
evaluated at δ’xi. Then, we can write equation [A.3] as a regression model: 
 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0( ) ´ ( )´ ( )i i i i i u u i iy x x= µ + µ − µ Φ + β + β − β Φ + σ − σ φ + ξ , [A.4] 
where φi = φ(δ’xi ), Φi =Φ(δ’xi ), and E(ξi)=0. The two-stage estimation procedure consists 
of (i) using the probit model we get maximum likelihood estimates of δ, and (ii) using 
these, we get estimated values of φi and Φi. Thus, regressing yi on a constant, xi, φi and Φi 
and the interaction variables xiΦi we get consistent estimates of σ1u-σ0u and the rest of 
parameters. 
 Since we have more than one cross-section, we estimate the parameters in the 
random effects panel data model by pooling each wave of data and, therefore, applying the 
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 See Maddala (1983) and references therein for details. 
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previous estimation technique to the pooled data. The estimate of the selection equation is 
also based on the pooled sample, including time dummies as additional regressors.19 
Notice that the parameter of main interest for us is (µ1 -µ0), that is, the differential 
effect of the dummy variable indicating the legal form. Moreover, in the previous 
specification the effect of x varies among firms with different values for d. Estimating  
equation [A.4] allows us to test which coefficients are different in β1 and β0. Since some of 
the interaction terms xΦ may be insignificant, this procedure enables us to implicitly 
impose restrictions on the equality on some coefficients between the regression 
coefficients in the two regimes.20 
The interpretation of the covariance terms σ1u and σ0u  plays a crucial role in the 
discussion of selectivity bias. For that purpose, it is useful to write equation [A.3] as 
( )
( )i
i
uiii
x
x
xdxyE i
'
')1,( 1111
δ
δφσβµ
Φ
++== ,  [A.5] 
and 
( )
( )i
i
uiii
x
x
xdxyE i
'1
')0,( 0000
δ
δφσβµ
Φ−
−+== ,  [A.6] 
If firms choose the regime which is a maximum (comparative advantage hypothesis), the 
only necessary condition for consistency of the model is that σ0u < σ1u, but σ1u and σ0u can 
have any signs. For example, one case might be that σ1u > 0, σ0u > 0 but with the additional 
restriction that σ1u > σ0u. Hence, if  σ1u > 0, this means that 
iii xdxyE i 11)1,( 1 βµ +>=  and 
iii xdxyE i 11)0,( 1 βµ +<=  
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 Time dummies were also included in the risk exposure equation, but turned out to be insignificant.  
20
 In fact, in the empirical specification, we considered cases with and without different β1 and β0. Since the 
differences turned out to be insignificant, we only report estimation results imposing β1 = β0. 
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that is, the expected productivity of those firms actually choosing limited liability is greater 
than 1µ +β1x, and the expected productivity of those who do not choose limited liability is 
less than 1µ +β1x. Similarly, if σ0u > 0, 
iii xdxyE i 00)1,( 0 βµ +>=  and 
iii xdxyE i 00)0,( 0 βµ +<=  
Therefore, the limited group dominates (in the sense of higher productivity) in both 
productivity equations. However, since σ1u > σ0u, those who choose limited are better than 
average in both limited and unlimited, but they are better in limited than in unlimited, 
)1,()1,( 01 =>= iiiii dxyEdxyE i   
Furthermore, it will also be true that those who choose unlimited are below average in both 
limited and unlimited, but they are better in unlimited than in limited, 
)0,()0,( 10 =>= iiiii dxyEdxyE i   
Notice that estimating equation [A.4], using all observation on y, enables us to estimate 
σ1u- σ0u directly.21 This, the estimation of [A.4] is more convenient than separate 
estimation of [A.5] and [A.6] . 
It is important to note that the identification of the parameters of the model relies on 
the distributional assumption about the process generating risk exposure and legal form 
outcomes. That is to say, assuming that the disturbances are distributed tri-variate normal 
is enough to identify the model and it is not strictly necessary the presence of a regressor in 
the legal choice equation that does not affect the risk exposure variable. 
                                                 
21
 Notice that the signs of the covariances are opposite from those presented in Trost (1981) or Maddala 
(1983) because the selection equation is written with a positive disturbance in this paper; and is written with a 
negative disturbance in those. 
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Fixed effects 
We can extend the previous approach to the case of fixed effects models, in which 
the time invariant unobserved heterogeneity among firms can be correlated with the 
explanatory variables. In order to deal with the endogeneity problem controlling for fixed 
effects, we consider a switching regression model for N firms observed T consecutive time 
periods. Using simultaneously more than one wave for estimation requires that we 
explicitly include the time period in the notation:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0 1 0 0 1 0( ) ' ( ) ' 'i i i i i i i iy x x x x g x x= µ + µ − µ Φ δ + β + β −β Φ δ + φ δ + ξ  
If we were to assume that η is uncorrelated with each x, we could apply pooled switching 
regression estimators, as we covered in previous section. If η is correlated with any 
element of x,
 
then the pooled estimator is biased and inconsistent. Therefore, we can 
difference equation [A.5] to eliminate the time-constant unobservable η. Then, 
differencing equation [A.5] gives 
 
which is just a linear model with selectivity correction terms in the differences of all 
variables. Similarly to the cross-section case, consistent estimates of the parameters can be 
obtained by a two-stage estimation procedure on equation [A.8]. In this case, the selectivity 
terms are calculated in a first step estimating the selection equation for each year 
separately. Thus, these terms are differenced along with everything else. In a second 
step...Decir que la interpretacion de las covarianzas se mantiene como en el caso anterior. 
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Table 1. Main Characteristics of Spanish Firms’ Legal Forms 
 
Type Liability 
Capital 
requirements 
Partners Other characteristics 
Individual 
Firms 
Sole  
Proprietorship 
(SP) 
Unlimited 
No upper 
/lower limit 
1 (max.) 
Non-strict accounting procedures nor corporate 
governance mechanisms 
Full (personal) liability for the firm’s debt and credits 
Corporate 
firms1 
Collective Association 
(CA) Unlimited 
Ptas.50 mill. 
(max.) 2-50 (max.) 
Non-strict accounting procedures nor corporate 
governance mechanisms 
Participations are not tradable. Full (personal) liability 
Sociedad  
Limitada 
(SA) 
Limited 
PTAs. 0,5 mill. 
(min.) 1 (min.) 
Strict accounting procedures and corporate governance 
mechanisms 
Participations are not tradable. A SL may change its legal 
form only to SA or CA 
 
Sociedad  
Anónima 
(SA) 
Limited 
Ptas.10 mill. 
(min)2 1 (min.) 
Strict accounting procedures and corporate governance 
mechanisms 
Shares are tradable. A SA may change its legal form only 
to SL or CA 
1 There are other possible legal forms in Spain, but only apply to a fraction of firms (less than 2%) and correspondingly, to very specific economic 
circumstances. 
2 This limit was compulsory by June 30, 1992. All sociedades anónimas whose capital was below it were forced either to increase their capital or to transform 
into SL or CA. 
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Table 2. Sample Description 
Periods 
in the sample 
Number 
of firms 
Fraction 
(in %) 
1993-1994 (2 years) 
1992-1994 (3 years) 
1991-1994 (4 years) 
1990-1994 (5 years) 
74 
47 
28 
1164 
5.64 
3.58 
2.13 
88.65 
Total 1313 100 
 
Table 3. Overview of variables and summary statistics 
(standard deviations in parenthesis) 
Variable Description Mean (Limited liability) 
Mean (Limited 
liability) 
Size Number of 
employees 198.32 (523.6) 17.73 (15.14) 
Export/Import Dummy for exports 
or imports 0.63 (0.48) 0.24 (0.42) 
Age1 Dummy for age of the firm between 0-5 0.18 (0.38) 0.11 (0.31) 
Age2 
Dummy for age of 
the firm between 6-
20 
0.42 (0.49) 0.45 (0.49) 
Age3 Dummy for age of the firm >20 0.39 (0.48) 0.43 (0.49) 
Control 
Dummy for 
coincidence 
between owner and 
manager 
0.43 (0.49) 0.84 (0.36) 
Quote 
Dummy for quoting 
in the Stock 
exchange 
0.03 (0.16) 0 
Capital 
Dummy equals 1 if 
the firm is capital 
intensive 
0.67 (0.46) 0.60 (0.49) 
Debt Total debt/Total Assets 0.57 (0.24) 0.44 (0.29) 
Loc1 
Dummy equals 1 if 
the firm is located at 
Baleares, Cataluña, 
Navarra, Madrid, La 
Rioja 
0.43 (0.49) 0.38 (0.48) 
Loc3 Dummy equals 1 if 0.15 (0.35) 0.26 (0.44) 
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the firm is located at 
Andalucía, C. La 
Mancha, 
Extremadura 
Loc2 
Dummy equals 1 if 
the firm is located at 
the rest of regions 
0.42 (0.49) 0.35 (0.48) 
K/L ratio Capital-labor ratio 5089.07 (76.05) 2047.58 (32.15) 
Productivity Labor productivity 4184.86 (29.6) 2709.60 (33.42) 
 
 
Table 4. Legal form choice (selection equation) 
Independent 
variables 
Pooled, 
probit 
1990, 
probit 
1991, 
probit 
1992, 
probit 
1993, 
probit 
1994, 
probit 
Size 0.897 (4.21) 1.016 (2.23) 
0.506 
(1.51) 
0.837 
(1.86) 
0.522 
(0.23) 
0.428 
(0.32) 
Control -0.966 (-10.32) 
-1.543 (-
7.72) 
-0.761 (-
4.12) 
-1.149 (-
4.70) 
-1.044 (-
3.90) 
-0.382 (-
1.77) 
Export/Import 0.801 (9.26) 0.994 (4.51) 
0.839 
(4.57) 
0.779 
(4.08) 
0.693 
(3.47) 
1.046 
(4.63) 
Age2 -0.376 (-3.25) 
-0.097 (-
0.39) 
-0.317 (-
1.37) 
-0.550 (-
1.99) 
-0.333 (-
1.19) 
-0.732 (-
2.02) 
Age3 -0.860 (-6.83) 
-0.822 (-
2.89) 
-0.729 (-
2.85) 
-1.002 (-
3.31) 
-1.005 (-
3.40) 
-1.183 (-
3.10) 
Loc1 0.293 (2.89) 0.289 (1.22) 
0.279 
(1.35) 
0.457 
(2.00) 
0.343 
(1.37) 
0.091 
(0.34) 
Loc2 0.188 (1.90) 0.283 (1.19) 
0.208 
(1.00) 
0.363 
(1.65) 
0.135 
(0.58) 
-0.133 (-
0.52) 
Year 1991  0.285 (2.50)      
Year 1992 0.398 (3.39)      
Year 1993 0.586 (4.80)      
Year 1994 0.632 (5.09)      
Constant 2.930 (9.95) 3.289 (5.20) 
2.813 
(5.32) 
3.247 
(5.59) 
7.977 
(10.07) 
7.771 
(11.49) 
Log-Likelihood -673.97 -126.37 -159.67 -138.115 -117.44 -104.79 
Nº of observations 6,221 1,164 1,192 1,239 1,313 1,313 
Dependent variable: dummy equals 1 if the firm has limited liability and 0 otherwise. 
Sector dummies included. 
Figures in parenthesis are t-ratios. 
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Table 5. Risk exposure estimates. Random effects 
 Productivity Capital-Labor ratio 
 Pooled IV  Pooled Switching, IV Pooled IV Pooled Switching, IV 
Limited 1.344 (3.80) -10.618 (-2.34) 0.612 (0.64) -6.483 (2.33) 
Total debt/Total assets -2.131 (-3.97) -1.546 (-2.50) -2.817 (-2.06) -2.093 (-4.75) 
Control -0.638 (-3.66) -0.200 (-1.07) -2.344 (-5.72) -1.254 (-5.55) 
Export/Import 0.637 (3.21) 0.627 (2.59) -0.116 (-0.24) -0.447 (-0.13) 
Age2 -0.205 (-0.81) 0.310 (1.19) -1.751 (-1.47) -0.047 (-0.13) 
Age3 -0.028 (-0.10) 0.822 (2.61) -0.941 (-0.73) 1.093 (-0.15) 
Loc2 -0.188 (-1.0) -0.018 (-0.08) 0.635 (1.18) 0.498 (2.47) 
Loc3 0.265 (0.72) 0.486 (1.21) 0.385 (0.50) 0.920 (1.88) 
Size 1.242 (4.44) 0.614 (2.07) 2.459 (3.81) 0.885 (1.83) 
Quote 0.468 (0.73) 6.315 (4.16) 6.178 (1.59) 0.920 (0.40) 
Capital 0.899 (6.34) 0.815 (5.35) 5.187 (16.44) 3.931 (21.71) 
Constant 3.071 (6.13) 14.015 (3.03) 6.099 (3.69) 9.994 (3.38) 
σ1u- σ0u  9.869 (6.81)  7.281 (5.95) 
Number of observations 3,595 3,595 3,595 3,595 
Adjusted R2 0.2601 0.3337 0.2953 0.3475 
 
Figures in parenthesis are t-ratios. 
In IV estimation Total debt/Total assets in t-1 and t-2 are used as instruments. 
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Table 6. Risk exposure estimates. Fixed effects 
 Productivity Capital-Labor ratio 
 First differencing, IV        Switching, IV First differencing Switching 
Limited -3.342 (-5.89) -3.733 (-2.04) -0.571 (-0.26) -0.705 (-0.50) 
Total debt/Total assets -0.313 (-1.43) -2.300 (-2.87) 1.235 (2.18) 1.926 (2.30) 
Control -0.153 (-1.57) -0.306 (-2.50) -0.038 (-0.17) -0.334 (-2.05) 
Export/Import 0.073 (0.56) 0.273 (1.71) -0.215 (-0.73) -0.196 (-1.11) 
Age2 -0.141 (-0.85) -0.361 (-1.51) 0.329 (0.82) -0.023 (-0.14) 
Age3 -0.224 (-0.83) -0.319 (-0.85) 0.692 (1.14) 0.076 (0.24) 
Loc2 0.739 (1.20) 0.067 (0.07) 0.626 (0.44) -0.050 (-0.16) 
Loc3 0.778 (1.16) 0.202 (0.42) 1.421 (0.72) 0.627 (1.79) 
Size -2.828 (-7.97) -2.647 (-2.40) -3.213 (-4.18) -0.007 (-0.03) 
Quote -0.446 (-1.01) 0.878 (5.21) -0.927 (-1.03) 0.878 (0.58) 
Capital 0.159 (1.42) 0.018 (0.15) 1.522 (5.58) 1.073 (10.21) 
σ1u- σ0u  9.772 (2.45)  2.172 (1.53) 
Number of observations 3,595 3,595 3,595 3,595 
Adjusted R2 0.1099 0.1554 0.0984 0.1215 
 
Figures in parenthesis are t-ratios. 
In IV estimation Total debt/Total assets t-2 is used as instrument. 
 
